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The writer is director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
The Israeli strike that took place in the early hours of October 26 had been expected ever since the massive Iranian ballistic missile attack of October 1. What wasn’t known was its precise timing or the targets the Israeli leadership would pick. It will take a few days for a full picture of the damage done to emerge, but this much is clear: the attack was, by design, limited in scope, but nevertheless significant in impact.
The weeks of uncertainty over Israel’s choice of targets had made everyone — from the White House to Arab corridors of power to financial markets to expatriates in the Gulf — jittery and fearful of a potential expansion of the conflict. At the higher end were leadership sites, nuclear facilities and energy installations. In the mid-range of the options were military sites, including air defence systems and missile and drone production factories.
Targeting the former would have meant risking all-out war, which no country wanted. Choosing the latter was a way to tell Iran to go home or else.
As it is, Israel has again proven its military superiority against its ultimate rival. It remains the only power in the region capable of pulling off this sort of thing — indeed most European militaries would struggle to match the feat. Some in Israel, such as the opposition leader Yair Lapid, have argued that the scale of the strike was a mistake, and that the Israelis should have hit Iran harder.
A key consideration for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the US presidential election. The Biden administration and Democratic candidate Kamala Harris are keen to avoid a wider war, which would further increase discontent in their own party less than two weeks out from the poll. But no matter who wins on November 5, the period before the inauguration of the new president on January 20, 2025 will be a moment of maximum danger for the US administration and the region.
The Biden administration will claim that its advice acted as a constraint on Israel. It already has said that this latest strike should be “the end” of the direct exchanges between Israel and Iran, just as it believed that the assassinations of Yahya Sinwar and Hassan Nasrallah would have a decisive impact on the fighting in Gaza and Lebanon. That, however, has turned out to be wishful thinking on the Americans’ part.
Iran, whose supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei signalled a measured response on Sunday, faces a deepening dilemma: stand down but look weak and invite more attacks, or retaliate and risk total defeat. The loss of air defences leaves it vulnerable to further strikes. The destruction of missile production sites suggests that it will not be able to swiftly replenish its offensive arsenal to stay in the fight, while Israel receives more defensive systems and interceptors from the US and other countries.
Iran’s problems go deeper. Two out of the three pillars of its security strategy are shaken. Its battered militia partners in Lebanon, Palestine and Syria are no longer able to deter and punish Israel. Rebuilding them will take decades and may not even be possible. Its arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles and drones has not had the expected military impact. This will now need to be restocked and better technology developed. The last pillar of the strategy, its nuclear programme, is more vulnerable than ever, and rushing towards the production of a bomb may precipitate the very war that Iran has been trying to avoid.
Iran’s retaliatory options are narrowing. Consequently, it may look for less well-defended targets, such as US facilities and interests in the Gulf states. Growing anxiety in that part of the region is why Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others were quick to condemn the Israeli attacks and propose diplomatic off-ramps.
Ultimately, Israel remains in control of the escalation and could decide to press home its advantage. Today Netanyahu is the only Middle Eastern leader doing as he wishes, even as he watches others, including the US, concede and adjust.
Israeli officials believe that the country’s operational competence and success on the battlefield will overcome whatever political and moral qualms the Americans, Europeans and Arabs have about its conduct of these wars. Netanyahu was certainly pleased when Donald Trump told him on a recent call to “do what you have to do”. His defence planners are probably putting more ideas on the table. But, like the Iranians, Netanyahu should beware the seductions of hubris.